I. INTRODUCTION
We have entered the biotech century. Advances in biotechnology are already transforming medicine, agriculture, and industry in ways undreamt of thirty years t Associate Professor, CUNY School of Law. I would like to thank B. Allen Schulz for his feedback and support, Greg Jaffe of Center for Science in the Public Interest for generously providing me with information, and Dean Phil Peters from the University of Missouri College of Law-Columbia for suggesting the project to me. I would also like to thank Jane Edwards, Kathy Prince, and their research staff for invaluable research assistance. I Letter from Dr. Paul Berg, Chair of the National Institutes of Health Advisory Committee Concerning Recombinant DNA Technology, to Dewitt Stetten; see also MICHAEL ROGERS, BIOHAZARD 151 (1977) (reflecting on the relaxed adherence to safety protocols for biotechnology research).
2 Michael Specter, The Pharmageddon Riddle, NEW YORKER, Apr. 10, 2000, at 58, 67 (quoting Robert B. Shapiro, former Chief Executive Officer and Chair of Monsanto, Inc.).
3 Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity defines biotechnology as "any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms or derivatives thereof to make or modify products or processes for specific use." CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, art. 2, USE OF TERMS, at http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp?lg=0&a=cbd-02 (last updated Dec. 6, 2003) . The United States defines biotechnology as "the use of modern scientific techniques, including genetic engineering, to improve or modify plants, animals, and microorganisms." U.S. important safety issues have been sidelined in order to facilitate rapid growth of this nascent industry. First and foremost, readily available and far safer alternatives could be used instead of food crops for biopharm production. But, because market forces diverge from the public's interest on this point, those safer options have not been pursued. Without government action forcing innovation towards achieving public health ends, it is clear that these options will remain unexplored. At the very least, there should be a moratorium on field testing these crops until a host of healthrelated questions are answered. Among the most pressing questions are: Do biopharm residues bioaccumulate? 20 Is there a threshold below which these compounds can be safely consumed? Are there low-level, long-term health effects? Are these compounds allergens 21 or toxins? 22 Are biopharmed crops antinutrients? 23 How persistent are these compounds in the soil? How toxic are they to wildlife? How likely is the prospect that these non-food compounds could be spread to wild relatives? 2 4 any human health impacts, biopharm contamination of the food supply will likely have dramatic ramifications for the U.S. share of the global commodities market. Id. 20 An allergic reaction is an abnormal response of the body's immune system to an otherwise safe compound. Some reactions are life threatening, such as anaphylactic shock. Some of the biopharm products currently under development have been engineered to produce trypsin. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,087,558 (issued July I1, 2000) (claiming invention of a transgenic plant that produces trypsinogen-a precursor of trypsin). Trypsin has a history of eliciting allergic responses in exposed populations. (1996) .
22 A toxic reaction in humans is a response to a poisonous substance. Unlike allergic reactions, all humans are subject to toxic reactions. The Codex Alimentarius considers evaluations of allergenicity, toxicity, and anti-nutrient potential to be integral components of any food safety risk assessment process. 
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Unfortunately, under the U.S. fractured regulatory system, there is no way to pose these questions with regard to biopharm crops, let alone to answer them. Part of the problem is that no regulatory agency has a clear statutory mandate to regulate biopharming. 25 As a result, there are no coherent overarching government 2 policies capable of ensuring that this new technology is safely explored and exploited. 2 The crisis is on our doorstep. According to some predictions, at least 10% of U.S. agricultural lands will be devoted to biopharming by the end of the decade. 27 Thousands of inedible and potentially harmful compounds may soon be grown in corn fields throughout the country. Without detailed and enforceable standards for responsible use of this new technology, it is inevitable that these biopharm crops will contaminate crops destined for use as human food. 28 The health risks from consuming these adulterated foods could be considerable.
Nevertheless, industry and governmental regulators have failed to impose obvious biological controls that would greatly protect the public's safety, while still permitting exploitation of this technology. For example, biopharming ought not be done in food crops, or, at the very least, ought not be released into the open environment of an agricultural field (as opposed to being grown in a greenhouse) before basic research has demonstrated that there will be no negative health effects from consuming contaminated foods. 29 Instead of adopting these sensible precautions, regulators have simply assumed that contamination can be avoided through use of physical containment measures. This wildly optimistic assumption is not shared by biopharm developers who admit that biopharm proteins will likely 25 See infra Part II.B. The limited scope of existing biopharm regulation leaves the public unprotected and exposed to an unacceptable level of risk. Moreover, the mere threat of commingling may be enough to destroy the United States' multi-billion dollar export trade in corn and other commodities. 31 These failures to address the problem of contamination and commingling become even more critical now that the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has entered into force. 32 Article 10 of the Protocol gives states the power to refuse import of the products of biotechnology (called living modified organisms or LMOs in the Protocol) in order to avoid or minimize adverse effects on human health or the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 33 It is hard to imagine anything more likely to justify a refusal to import under the Cartagena Protocol than undetectable commingling of industrial or pharmaceutical crops containing non-food proteins with export food crops. Protecting the public's interest in this context will require government to assume a far more active role than the hands-off attitude that has been the hallmark of conventional agricultural policy.
This Article raises a few of the more pressing public health questions that should be resolved before substantial portions of the nation's crop land are diverted from food production to biopharming.
Part II provides an introduction to biopharming and outlines the various plans and projections for its commercial exploitation. Part III examines the existing regulatory structure, highlights some of its most critical weaknesses, and points out the serious risks this structure creates vis-dt-vis the integrity of the food supply. Part IV articulates a central conclusion that safe and successful exploitation of these new technologies will demand a markedly different regulatory regime than the laissez-faire system that has prevailed in conventional agricultural policy. To that end, the final Part proposes some alternatives that would better safeguard public health while still permitting exploration of this exciting new technology. 
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Over centuries and millennia, humans have domesticated modified food crops in order to improve their agronomic and nutritional characteristics. For most of human agronomic history, this was a process of trial and error. Although it was clear that desirable agronomic traits could be inherited, there was no way to predict the outcome of a cross between any two particular plants. In 1865, an Augustinian monk named Gregor Mendel changed all that. Working with pea plants, Mendel deduced that offspring inherited traits from their parents in predictable patterns. His paper, Versuche fiber Pflanzen-Hybriden ("Experiments in Plant Hybridization"), 34 concluded that "heritable factors" (genes or alleles) come in pairs; segregate independently; and are governed by principles of dominance and recessiveness. Although the paper initially went unnoticed in scientific circles, these patterns of inheritance are now referred to as the Mendelian laws of genetics.
Armed with an understanding of Mendel's work, plant and animal breeders transformed agriculture. By systematically crossing and recrossing individuals with desirable characteristics, breeders were able to create new varieties that were more productive and easier to grow.
35
Almost a century later, James Watson and Francis Crick's 1953 paper, A Structure for Deoxyribonucleic Acids, described the structure of DNA-the molecule responsible for Mendelian inheritance.
36
This paper is generally considered to have ushered in the era of molecular genetics. 37 The discovery of the Cohen and Boyer's concerns about the potential hazards of these new techniques mirrored similar concerns that other researchers were expressing. 42 In light of the as-yet-unassessed, but potentially harmful, consequences of this new research, the scientific community called for a voluntary moratorium on genetic engineering. 43 At a 1975 conference held at Asilomar Conference Center in Pine Grove, California, 150 scientists from around the world met to hammer out a set of safety precautions for genetic research. 44 Known as the Asilomar Consensus Statement, the conference recommended lifting the self-imposed moratorium and replacing it with guidelines for genetic engineering research. 45 The central assumption behind the consensus statement was that the unknown hazards of genetic engineering should be contained biologically and physically. 46 This consensus formed the basis for the Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines issued by the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") in 1976. 47 Until 1984, these guidelines, which applied to researchers funded by NIH, governed approval of DNA research. A successful legal challenge to decisions made under those guidelines forced the Reagan Administration to develop a more overarching regulatory policy to guide federal decision-making about biotechnology research and its products. 48 To that end, 237 SCIENCE 1176 237 SCIENCE , 1176 237 SCIENCE -83 (1987 .
57 There are three primary means to transform, or genetically modify, plants. The most common takes advantage of the unique properties of Agrobacterium tumefaciens, a soil bacteria that infects plants by transferring a plasmid of its own DNA into the target plant. By modifying the genes contained in this plasmid, A. tumefaciens infection can be a means to deliver desirable genes into plant cells instead of the bacteria's own infective genes, which cause Crown Gall disease. Because A. tumefaciens is a known plant pest, these transformations fall neatly within USDA's regulatory authority as outlined in the PPA, 7 U.S.C. § § 7701-7772. By contrast, USDA authority over the other primary methods of transforming plants, the "biolistics" or "gene gun" method and electroporation are less clear. These are the various techniques that I will refer to as genetic engineering, bioengineering, genetic modification, or biotechnology. lion's share of the 130 million GM acres planted worldwide. 61 In 2003, 73% of the cotton, 81% of the soybeans, and 40% of the corn planted in the United States were GM varieties.
62 Biotech research has grown at an even more explosive rate. In 1994, approximately 7,000 acres in the United States were planted with 593 biotech field tests; in 2001, there were 57,000 experimental acres planted with 1,117 field tests. 63 While most of these were field tests of first-generation GM crops (those engineered for herbicide resistance or to produce endogenous pesticides), some 300 64 were biopharm crops.
A. BIOPHARMING 101
During the 1990s, researchers around the world embarked on the most ambitious biotechnology project ever-the sequencing of the human genome. 65 The Human Genome Project 66 and related biomedical research spawned a generation of highly specialized drugs based on antigens (vaccines), recombinant proteins (biologics) and human antibodies (collectively "therapeutics").
67
Demand for therapeutics is growing rapidly, especially those designed for chronic illnesses like psoriasis, allergic asthma, and rheumatoid arthritis. 68 Meeting the projected demand for these therapeutics will require thousands of kilograms of purified proteins.
69
Commercial production of these products currently relies on abiotic fermentation (primarily in E. coli or yeast) or on mammalian cell culture (primarily in Chinese hamster ovary cells ("CHO cells")).
70
These expression systems have some serious drawbacks: they tend to be expensive, labor intensive, and they produce relatively low yields that fall short of supplying all patients in need. Generally, recombinant mammalian systems can produce about 1-4 grams of a therapeutic protein per liter of media every 2-3 weeks, 7 1 while recombinant E. coli systems yield 1-4 grams per liter every 1-2 days.
72
Recombinant monoclonal antibody culture in CHO cells yields .5-1 gram per liter per day, and mammalian cell 61 Id The increases are most dramatic in the United States, but Canada, Argentina, and China have also experienced significant growth in the development and use of biotechnology-derived crops. Id.
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perfusion bioreactor systems yield about .3 gram per liter each day. 3 Biopharming represents the cutting edge of the research on increasing yields with at least 120 different research institutions currently developing a staggering array of biopharm products. 74 At least in theory, plants can be engineered to express high levels of the desired pharmaceutical protein. 75 One 200-acre biopharm field could therefore produce significantly greater quantities of therapeutics than current methods. Moreover, biopharm crops offer some other distinct advantages for producing pharmaceutical proteins. Large-scale biopharming of these compounds should be more economical than current production techniques that rely on mammalian cell cultures. Because biopharming can be done by ordinary farmers in ordinary fields, rather than by highly skilled workers in high-tech facilities, the capital investment costs are relatively low. 76 Some estimates indicate that biopharming could reduce production costs for these therapeutics by an order of magnitude.
77 Biopharming can also draw on a wealth of existing agronomic experience with growing, harvesting and processing these crops in their conventional forms. Unlike CHO cell or E. coli production techniques, biopharming does not require a highly educated and techsavvy workforce. Biopharmed therapeutics may also be safer than those produced via existing techniques, because plant-produced therapeutics have a reduced risk of carrying human pathogens. The range of possible biopharm products under development is truly staggering. 79 For example, researchers at the Washington State University have transformed barley so that it produces cxl-antitrypsin, a human blood plasma protein used to treat cystic fibrosis and various skin diseases. 80 Barley has also been transformed to produce Antithrombin III, a human anticoagulant. 81 There has been a great deal of research on antibody production in biopharm plants, so-called
73
Id. and Epicyte has developed a corn-grown spermicidal plantibody that it hopes to market as a contraceptive. 92 Although biopharm research has been conducted on a wide variety of plant species, corn has become the crop of choice for biopharm companies looking to commercialize their products. 93 Indeed, the number of corn field tests dwarfs experimentation in all other crops combined. 94 Corn does offer a number of advantages-particularly the utility of corn cobs as a pre-packaged, cheap, and easily transported storage system. Unfortunately, this use of corn raises some serious safety questions because of the likelihood of contaminating the food supply. Corn is, after all, a promiscuously outcrossing, wind-pollinated plant. 95 Although The Committee's charge extends to all biobased industries, including biopharming. Although this Committee was a joint project between the Departments of Energy and Agriculture, the Vision Statement and Biomass Roadmap were emphatically a product of the interested industries. Perhaps not surprisingly, the tenor of the Committee's public policy recommendations was to support and facilitate development of biobased industry and to downplay any drawbacks. Missing from these recommendations is any discussion of the very serious public health 1 0 6 and environmental 1 0 7 concerns posed by this new technology. In shelving these concerns in favor of promoting industrial "progress," the Committee was merely continuing a tradition that had earlier been established by the 96 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS, supra note 14, at I I (noting that the extent of confidential business information claimed by registrants "hampers external review and transparency of the decision-making process"). The potential for these non-food proteins to render otherwise unidentifiable foods either allergenic or toxic to consumers is the most prominent of these public health concerns. Because biopharm crops look exactly like conventional crops, a consumer will have no way to know if she is inadvertently consuming dangerous compounds.
107 For example, the National Research Council ("NRC") has suggested that large-scale biobased production would necessitate withdrawing half the land currently fallow under the Conservation Reserve Program. See COMMITTEE ON BIOBASED INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, supra note 10, at 4. l DOE made it clear that the Technology Roadmap was "driven by industry" and that OIT's role was to "support the development and deployment of technologies that will shape the future of the agriculture industry." The Technology Roadmap was intended to "encourage industry to undertake long-term, sector-wide technology planning." ' "1 4 Conspicuously absent from this long-term, sector-wide planning is any consideration of the serious threats that improperly managed biopharm crops will pose to the U.S. food supply. Protecting the integrity of the food supply is not among the priorities identified in the Roadmap, and environmental protection is thrown in as an afterthought."1 5 No consumer or environmental non-government organizations , no public health experts, and for that matter no Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") or Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") officials participated in the workshops that produced the Roadmap. 116 The only U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") officials were from the Agricultural Research Service,i"' USDA's in-house biopharm research arm. . 1I, 2003) . Given ARS's mandate, it is difficult to imagine the agency as a voice for caution in the Roadmap process.
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No Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") officials experienced in the logistical problems of trying to prevent cross-contamination and commingling of agricultural crops were invited to participate.
It was a serious mistake to exclude these important stakeholders from the "longterm sector-wide" planning process.
The Vision Statements and Roadmaps produced under these circumstances were seriously flawed and are unable to cope with the very real problems posed by biopharming.
III. REGULATORY GAPS AND BIOPHARMING
USDA has little experience or familiarity with the non-food compounds involved in biopharming," I some of which are known to have deleterious effects on human health. For example, the first commercialized biopharm crop is a corn plant engineered to produce industrial grade avidin, a diagnostic reagent isolated from chicken egg. l l 9 Avidin is known to cause vitamin B deficiency upon excessive ingestion.
20
The National Academy of Science has been extremely critical of USDA's handling of avidin corn, calling it an example of lax and inadequate regulation. 121 Other biopharm crops similarly produce compounds not intended for consumption as food; indeed, many are intended for oral delivery of medicines.
There has been little assessment of the potential health impacts from food contaminated with these or any other biopharm crops.'
22 Despite a clear likelihood that people will ingest these antibodies, plastics, and vaccines with their cornflakes, we have no knowledge about the health effects of consuming these compounds.1 2 3
Exposure through ingestion raises serious questions that should be answered before these crops are commercialized and grown in uncontrolled conditions. Unfortunately, this means of exposure falls entirely outside the existing regulatory scheme and is completely unregulated.
124
Because the biopharm crops are not intended for food, they fall entirely outside FDA's regulatory authority.'
12
Nor does USDA evaluate the health effects of contamination in its permit process. Instead, USDA imposes a series of physical containment measures on these crops and then assumes that these measures will prevent contamination of the food supply. 126 This reliance on physical containment measures flies in the face of all available information about how such measures actually work. Although few biopharm crops have been commercialized, the first generation of GM crops have been planted commercially for the past six years---enough time to develop some sense of how well required physical containment measures are being implemented for those crops. Unfortunately, industry's track record on successfully containing GM crops remains singularly unimpressive. A series of near-miss disasters has undermined public confidence in existing regulatory processes.
StarLink corn is by far the most famous example of how poorly physical containment measures prevent contamination of the food supply when a food crop is genetically modified in a manner that precludes its use as food.
127 StarLink corn was genetically engineered to produce Bt toxin,' 28 a pesticide toxic to some common lepidopteran pests. 129 Because of the particular nature of the genetic transformation involved in creating StarLink corn,' 30 there were unanswered questions about whether StarLink corn was a human allergen.' 3 1 As a result of these allergenicity concerns, StarLink corn was not approved for use as human food. 132 In order to get permission to market StarLink corn for animal feed or industrial uses, its manufacturer assured government regulators that the corn would be kept out of the human food supply.
133
In September of 2000, however, a coalition of environmental groups announced they had discovered StarLink corn in twenty-three common grocery products. The announcement set off a frenzy of product recalls and consumer panic. 
16.
128 StarLink corn was genetically engineered to contain two novel genes-one conveying herbicide tolerance and one conveying insect resistance. Uchtmann, supra note 50, at 160. The herbicide tolerance gene was the product of an earlier approval process. It was the addition of a gene derived from the bacterial species Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
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than 300 types of processed foods that had to be pulled from grocery shelves around the world. 136 Under heavy pressure from USDA, StarLink's manufacturer, Aventis, contacted growers and repurchased their remaining StarLink corn to ensure that no more of it entered the food supply.' 37 These efforts were relatively successful and most of the StarLink crop was removed from the food supply. 138 Although there was a "medium likelihood" that StarLink corn was allergenic, 139 the anti-GM activists had caught the contamination before much non-food corn had entered the food supply.
140 Therefore, the Centers for Disease Control and FDA concluded that based on the low exposure there was only a "low probability" that consumers would actually develop allergies to it.' 41 Even so, the StarLink fiasco had a devastating effect on consumer confidence in biotechnology and raised troubling questions about whether the integrity of the food supply is adequately protected. 142 After all, it was only because GM opponents independently tested packaged corn foods for StarLink contamination and then gave their discovery of contamination so much publicity that so little StarLink corn made it into the food supply. That fortunate situation owed nothing to the effectiveness of regulatory oversight. The crisis also devastated U.S. grain exports. 139 See CDC REPORT, supra note 130. Blood tests failed to find signs of antibodies to the protein in the genetically engineered corn. Thus, the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") concluded that although the study participants may have experienced allergic reactions, based upon the results of their study alone, CDC "could not conclude that a reported illness was a [StarLink] allergic reaction." Id. CDC also cautioned that they could not rule out the possibility because food allergies may occur without detectible serum antibodies to the antigen. Id.
140 Bratspies, supra note 127, at 628, 645. 14 At both sites, government inspectors discovered ProdiGene corn, which had been engineered to produce a swine vaccine, growing amidst soybeans destined for human consumption. 1' 4 9 These plants were "volunteers" having grown from seeds left in the soil from a prior year's field trial. Despite a warning to destroy the biopharm corn, 15 the Nebraska grower instead harvested his fields and sent the soybeans to an elevator where stalks and leaves from the bioengineered corn were commingled with the soybeans already present in the elevator. 1 5 ' Because the soybeans were now contaminated with the non-food biopharm corn, APIS ordered the destruction of all 500,000 bushels of soybeans in the elevator. The ProdiGene incidents illustrate the problems inherent to using food plants to produce non-food drugs or industrial feedstocks. Although the biopharm version looks just like the food crop, the two are not fungible.' 56 In this case, none of the biopharmed corn seems to have made it all the way into the food supply, but it was a close call.
Unfortunately, StarLink and ProdiGene are not the only examples of how lax compliance with physical segregation requirements threatens the U.S. food supply. As 2002 drew to a close, EPA announced it had levied fines against two more biotechnology firms, this time in Hawaii, for failure to properly manage experimental, non-food GM crops.
157 Dow Agrosciences and Pioneer Hi-Bred were both fined for failure to take proper measures to prevent corn intended for human consumption from being contaminated with experimental, non-approved GM corn.
158
As part of the settlements, both companies reaffirmed their commitment to following permit conditions in the future and to immediately reporting any irregularities or violations.1 5 9 Just four months later, however, Pioneer Hi-Bred was again in hot water. EPA fined the company $72,000 for failing to notify EPA immediately of a new incident in which experimental, non-food corn contaminated food crops. The growing evidence of cross-contamination from biopharm and experimental GM crops raises serious questions about the overall likelihood that biopharming can to develop a written compliance program designed to ensure future compliance with the Plant Protection Act, federal regulations, and permit conditions. Id. 16 3 This history of multiple lapses and failures to follow containment protocols do not bode well for safe use of this technology. That basic safety precautions were not taken during the earliest stages of the technology's development ought to raise alarms regarding what will happen if the crops ever go into full-scale production. Environmental and human health impacts of biopharming will only increase as more and more of these crops are planted. These concerns are magnified by proposals to produce more than one novel protein simultaneously in the same plant, and/or to reuse the crops as food once the biopharm compounds have been extracted, a proposal known as "co-production.
B. USDA HAS ABDICATED ITS REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES
The United States has no comprehensive statute addressing the testing and monitoring of genetically engineered products. Indeed, such products have never been tested for long-term effects on human health. Rather, genetically engineered products are regulated under existing statutes relating to food, drugs, agriculture, or the environment based on the product's intended use. 165 FDA, 166 
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Biopharming does not fit well into this regulatory scheme. Although the therapeutics produced through biopharming will be drugs (and will thus be subject to FDA's traditional drug safety evaluations under the FFDCA), the crops themselves are neither drugs nor food. Thus, even though it is inevitable that these biopharm products will find their way into the food supply, the biopharm crops fall entirely outside FDA's scope of authority. Unless the biopharm crops also produce pesticides, EPA has no authority over these crops either, even though there are clear environmental risks from spread of biopharm pollens or proteins. Thus, it falls solely to USDA to regulate biopharming.
Under the best of circumstances, properly regulating these crops would be a daunting task. Circumstances are, however, far from ideal. USDA regulates these crops under the same authority it uses to regulate other GM crops-the Plant Protection Act ("PPA"). 7° The PPA focuses primarily on agronomic risks, and does not give USDA a clear mandate to consider food safety or environmental concerns.'' Not only is its regulatory authority constrained, but USDA has an added problem-it holds conflicting mandates both to protect safety and to promote this new industry.
In 174 USDA, the lead regulatory agency, self-described itself as the technology's lead advocate and announced that it would "cooperate with the private sector in developing and demonstrating the potential commercial viability"' 175 of biopharming. With the agency avowing its intent to encourage accelerated research and development, 176 who, if anyone, is protecting the public's interests in having this technology exploited only under conditions that protect human health and environmental safety?
This conflict between protection and promotion is visible in the regulatory scheme APHIS adopted. Until recently, scrutiny of biopharm crops was extremely light. 177 Field tests could proceed under a streamlined notification process and no permit was required. 179 In its summary of the new rules, APHIS emphasized that these biopharm products are never meant to enter the food supply and indicated that a stringent regulatory system would be necessary.180
To that end, APHIS imposed safety measures based on plans for physical segregation.
Seeking to control the likely routes for contamination, the new requirements introduced regular inspections, and imposed growing conditions and farm equipment standards. ' For the first time, there were: 1) mandatory field site inspections;
182 2) a requirement that no biopharm corn be grown within one mile of open-pollinated corn; 183 and 3) restrictions on the production of food and feed crops at the field test site and perimeter fallow zone in the subsequent growing season. 184 In addition to these in-field physical containment measures, APHIS also imposed a series of logistical requirements designed to minimize contact. APHIS required that biopharm crops be planted and harvested with dedicated mechanized equipment that will be stored in dedicated facilities. 185 In addition, APHIS must approve equipment cleaning procedures 86 and seed cleaning and drying procedures, 18 7 and all biopharm producers must attend a training program to increase the likelihood of compliance with permit conditions.1 88 APHIS characterized these new regulations as a revision of the regulatory framework "that reflects the latest science and information so that we can maintain the integrity of our systems."' 18 9 Although APIIS claimed that the new conditions were "science based and reflect[ed] the anticipated increase of requests for permits for plants genetically engineered to produce pharmaceutical and industrial compounds,"' 90 it is clear that this agency action was reactive rather than proactive. 97 Only public disclosure of the ProdiGene nearmiss, coming on the heels of the StarLink fiasco prompted APHIS to act.
It remains to be seen how APHIS will administer its physical containment measures. As the crops move into commercial production, it is extremely unlikely that APHIS will be able to oversee or enforce these regulations. APIS reports that in 2002, 130 acres of pharmaceutical biopharm crops were planted at thirty-four sites, most of which were smaller than 5 acres. 198 While APIUS might theoretically retain sufficient staff and resources to conduct 238 visits to the existing field trials (the National Research Council concluded that ten APHIS employees' duties included inspecting these fields), 2 0 4 the agency has indicated that it expects requests for field test permits and the scale of production to increase significantly over the next few years.
2°5 APHIS' overloaded staff already reviews approximately 1,000 applications for field testing and deregulation of further. Certainly if the United States achieves the Roadmap vision of biopharming producing 10% of chemical feedstocks by 2020 (and that figure does not include the expected boom in biopharmaceuticals!), APHIS will not be able to conduct all the required visits. Indeed, the number of test plantings will not have to increase by much before APHIS' resources will be inadequate to make the promised seven visits over two years to each test plot. Moreover, once full production begins, the agency will not have the capacity to visit every commercial grower on such a schedule. Without this critical piece of the regulatory patchwork, it is unclear how APHIS envisions fulfilling its compliance monitoring obligations, particularly since GM purveyors routinely use CBI claims to keep field test locations secret.
2°7 Coupled with the lack of oversight staff, this prevalence of CBI claims is particularly troubling. While the companies have a legitimate interest in preventing corporate vandalism or corporate espionage, the public has a strong interest in knowing whether biopharmed crops are contaminating adjacent conventional crops with substances that are clearly not intended for human or animal consumption. Secrecy eliminates the possibility that private actors will be able to independently monitor contamination levels. Since there is no governmental monitoring system, and no requirement that the GM purveyors monitor surrounding fields for contamination, shutting off the possibility of third-party monitoring means that there will be no monitoring of any kind. Remember, the StarLink fiasco came to light solely as a result of vigilant third-party monitoring.
20 8 The lack of independent monitoring is a serious deficiency, one that all but ensures that the regulatory scheme is unlikely to be responsive and trustworthy.
Indeed, these exact same constraints have prevented physical containment measures from achieving more than marginal success as a risk management tool for other GM crops, in particular those crops modified to express Bt toxins. Because of concerns about rapid evolution of pest resistance, EPA has developed some simple conditions for how Bt crops can be planted. In particular, EPA requires that, at most, 80% of the corn on a farm be Bt corn, with the other 20% conventional corn. 09 In addition, these conventional corn refuges must be planted within one quarter mile of the Bt fields. 210 An industry survey conducted during the 2002 growing season indicated that 11% of farmers failed to comply with these requirements . 21 The Center for Science in the Public Interest examined a parallel set of data submitted to USDA's National Agricultural Statistical Service, and discovered that growers self-reported information amounted to non-compliance levels 40% higher than those reported through the industry survey. 212 Similarly, a USDA review of compliance found that 20% of Bt corn growers failed to comply 
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with federal growing requirements. The Prodigene fiasco certainly suggests that there is no reason to expect that biopharm growers will be any more compliant than are farmers growing other GM crops, and thus, depending on farmers to implement physical containment measures should not be the primary plan for keeping biopharm crops out of the food supply.
Even putting aside the careless or intentional acts at the root of StarLink (and Prodigene), the physical containment of living plants is next to impossible. Plants reseed themselves. It requires eternal vigilance on the part of the grower to eradicate the volunteer plants that grow the next season, and such vigilance is both timeconsuming and expensive. Moreover, these volunteer plants might grow in neighboring fields in addition to the test fields themselves. Behaviors needed to control volunteer plants are not easily captured by a regulatory system based on physical segregation. The constant monitoring needed to identify and eradicate these volunteer plants places a significant burden on growers.
Because the risks are difficult to understand, and there is no way to recapture the added costs of this monitoring, growers are likely to slip up on their efforts. Any such lapses render physical containment measures-USDA's sole regulatory plan for protecting the food supply-wholly ineffective. These lapses are particularly likely because pollen drift is nearly impossible to control and is difficult to trace.
214
This is a fatal flaw in USDA's decision to rely exclusively on physical containment measures, and it is not amenable to easy solution. For physical containment to have any hope of working, growers must be committed and dedicated to eradicating volunteers. Nevertheless, USDA requires no certification or special training for biopharmers, nor has USDA created a monitoring and reporting system to track the occurrence of volunteer plants. In fact, USDA has no way to monitor either grower vigilance or actual incidents of contamination. Even if USDA required that growers report their planting patterns and actually followed up to ensure that the plantings correctly matched the submitted patterns, such measures would bear no relationship to grower vigilance against volunteers and would utterly fail to detect contamination of nearby fields.
Compounding the problem, USDA has not required biopharm companies to develop tests to identify biopharm contamination, nor has it developed such tests on its own.
2 15 Remember, biopharm crops are phenotypically indistinguishable from food crops. Without a readily available and easily performed identity test, grain silos and food manufacturers have no way to know whether they are inadvertently purchasing biopharmed crops. We have seen this before. It was precisely this inability to distinguish food corn from non-food corn that gave rise to the StarLink fiasco.
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In the most recent guidance to industry, USDA and FDA "strongly recommend," but do not require, that companies develop tests to identify contamination in raw agricultural products.
1 7 A mere recommendation, however strong, is totally inappropriate here. Tests to discover contamination cannot be optional. In the absence of an express requirement, no biopharm developer has produced such a test. Without the test, there is no way to identify biopharm crops or contaminated crops and to ensure that such crops are diverted to non-food uses. Moreover, UDSA's guidance does not suggest, "strongly" or otherwise, that biopharm purveyors monitor adjacent crops for evidence of contamination. Apparently, APHIS has satisfied itself that its proposed field practices will prevent contamination. APHIS inspectors will, at best, monitor to see if those field practices are being met.
2 18 The agency has no intentions of monitoring, or requiring the biopharm purveyor to monitor, for actual contamination of nearby crops with nonfood biopharm compounds. 21 9 Thus, there is no way to learn whether the physical containment practices, APIUS' primary regulatory strategy, are working. The National Research Council points to this "lack of rigor" in APHIS procedures as a potential source of serious contamination problems. 220 Indeed, in other contexts, FDA recognizes "develop[ing], enhanc [ing] , and maintain[ing] surveillance systems that can quickly and accurately identify food safety risks in the human food" as the key to an effective emergency response capability. 221 Because USDA does not require that tests be developed to identify contamination, there is no such surveillance system for biopharmed crops and no way to respond quickly in an emergency. In light of the industry's checkered history of contamination and commingling, there is no excuse for failing to require such tests.
IV. REPAIRING THE INADEQUATE AND POROUS REGULATORY SYSTEM
Non-food biotech products will enter the human food supply. After examining the prospect of corn biopharming in the Corn Belt, the National Research Council concluded that using food crops to produce non-edible and potentially harmful 222 compounds creates serious regulatory issues.
In an unusually frank editorial, NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY identified some of the major flaws with reliance on physical confinement: that gene-containment is next to impossible in the field and 217 See FDA full arsenal of agency powers to respond to this serious threat to the safety of the food supply.
Given what we know from experience with other GM crops, it is entirely inappropriate for the government to approach biopharming on a post hoc basis. Regulators must be involved at the planning stages; they cannot wait for developers come to the agencies with a largely completed product. At that point, modifications to protect public health are after-the-fact add-ons, and are far more expensive and less effective than design modifications would have been during the development process.
B. POSSIBLE BIOLOGICAL CONTROL MEASURES
In the earliest stages of biotechnology, the Asilomar Conference recognized that "[t]he most significant contribution to limiting the spread of recombinant DNA is the use of biological barriers.
232 Somehow this initial insight was lost. Rather than a mere "additional factor of safety, 2 33 physical containment measures have taken precedence as the primary means to contain biopharming's adverse effects. This inverted reliance on physical, rather than biological, containment measures must be reversed.
Use of Non-Food Crops
APHIS' post-Prodigene physical containment requirements mark a start towards responsible regulation.
The requirements will undoubtedly strengthen the protections of the food supply, but they are too little, too late. Other measures would provide far greater protection without simultaneously creating the need for a detailed and expensive oversight system.
The most obvious of these measures would be to require that biopharming occur only in non-food crops like tobacco, hemp or switch grass. Simply put, since it will not be possible to keep biopharm corn out of the food supply, food crops should not be production vehicles for biopharming. 234 Such a rule would be the clearest way to protect public health while still permitting society to benefit from the potential represented by this new technology. In one fell swoop, USDA could eliminate any possibility of commingling. The clean regulatory line of "no biopharming in food crops" would be easy to comply with, thus fitting neatly into the various vision statements and roadmaps aimed at nurturing this technology by avoiding burdensome regulation. Moreover, many biopharm developers have hedged their bets and have proceeded with parallel development of biopharm crops in tobacco. 
CONSUMING (F)EARS OF CORN
Thus, non-food biopharming could serve a dual public interest-providing access to needed therapeutics while, at the same time, weaning tobacco farmers from a perverse dependence on a continued market for cigarettes.
The biopharming industry itself agrees that it cannot afford another public relations disaster, and certainly not a public health catastrophe. 236 Food producers have called for a ban on biopharming in food crops. 237 The Grocery Manufacturers of America have also urged biotech companies to stop using food crops as vehicles for growing biotech products that humans and animals are not supposed to eat. 238 
Chloroplast Transformation
At the very least, biopharm crops should always be modified through chloroplast transformation 239 -a means to produce high levels of novel proteins while ensuring that the pollen does not contain transgenes. 240 Because chloroplasts are maternally inherited, there are usually no chloroplasts in pollen.
2 4 1 Transforming chloroplast DNA rather than nuclear DNA would greatly reduce the threat of crosspollination. 242 As such, this biological containment mechanism could be a partial solution to contamination of the food supply. Ideally, those two biological safety measures would be combined so that biopharming occurs in non-food crops that have undergone chloroplast transformation. These biological segregation methods could be added to the physical segregation methods APHIS now imposes, but the need for oversight would be less pressing because the risks to human health would be radically reduced. Although biopharm crops are developed enough to make these design modification choices expensive, and therefore unpalatable, it is not too late to require these sensible and practical restrictions on exploitation of the new technology.
When protection of the food supply rests entirely on physical containment measures, there are at least four likely routes for these biopharmed non-food crops to enter the human food supply: I) direct human action intentionally or negligently contaminating the food supply; 2) volunteer plants contaminating the next year's food crops; 3) pollen drift contaminating nearby food crops; and 4) improperly cleaned farm machinery or spilled seeds contaminating food crops. All four have already occurred with experimental GM or biopharm crops, and unless steps are taken, all surely will occur again.
Under the Plant Protection Act, USDA has responded piecemeal to welldeveloped proposals upon which companies have already spent a great deal of money. Under such circumstances, and constrained by its tenuous lines of authority, USDA has not sufficiently considered overarching concerns. This regulatory hole is undeniably attributable to the agency's hopelessly conflicted mission, but is made worse by the absence of any laws directed specifically at regulating biotechnology.
The Framework's requirement that biotechnology be regulated under existing law seriously hampers agency ability to propose and enforce needed rules. Regulators have tried to cobble together a scheme by taking bits and pieces of a whole series of laws drafted to confront other problems. In doing so, they have already stretched existing laws almost beyond recognition, 250 and all for naught. The regulatory scheme created by these contortions is simply not up to the task.
The status quo is unsafe and unacceptable. We must not wait for a tragedy before taking the sensible steps that will ensure safe exploration of this technology. We need laws and regulations that are directly on point. These laws must clarify the government's authority to supervise earlier stages in the biopharm crop development process in order to require biological containment measures. At least as important, specific agencies need express delegations of clear regulatory responsibilities and goals.
2 51 USDA has used tenuous lines of authority to make important and highly politicized policy decisions about a technology on the frontiers of science. It has made these decisions, moreover, with little or no scientific information, and in a political climate strongly favoring technology. It is perhaps not surprising that, under the circumstances, the agency has been wholly responsive rather than proactive.
Without direct congressional action on this front, we can expect only more of the same-the agency will continue to make post hoc approval decisions that do not, and indeed cannot, incorporate some of the most serious concerns about this new technology. The only way out of this conundrum is for Congress to take charge and pass new laws directly addressing the problems surrounding biopharming. These laws should recognize the unique nature of biopharmed crops and require development of a special regulatory system devoted to the specific challenges posed by the new technology. A statutory presumption against the use of food crops would go a long way towards curing the flaws identified in this Article. This presumption would not be irrebuttable, but could be overcome only upon a showing that use of non-food crops is technically infeasible and that the public interest at stake is important or compelling. The biopharm crop developer should have the burden of proof on each of these points. Such a rule would permit biopharming in food crops if it is truly in the public's interest, but would not permit private commercial assessments of profitability to supplant significant public safety concerns.
The existing scheme leaves the public exposed and vulnerable. There is no way to impose USDA's post hoc physical containment measures in a way that will actually be protective of the public health without also creating a cost-prohibitive and burdensome oversight system. And, even were USDA to actually institute such a detailed and omnipresent system, physical containment simply cannot be done. Cross-pollination will occur; farmers will fail to follow planting requirements; and accidents will happen. Use of food crops for biopharming therefore guarantees that at least low levels, and possibly significant quantities, of biopharmed proteins will wind up in human foods. There is no Plan B, no backup means for decontaminating the food supply. Indeed, once these crops are developed and marketed, the only possible restrictions will be extremely costly to implement and none of them can successfully protect the nation's food supply from contamination.
V. CONCLUSION
Working within a regulatory framework largely unfettered by environmental or health and safety considerations, it is perhaps not surprising that biotech developers focused on corn as the most immediately cost-effective vehicle for their project. 253 Corn is well characterized and the growing cycle is well understood.
2 54 And, of course, there is the influence of corn boards and lobbies. With few regulators raising concerns about cross-fertilization and commingling, developers spent years and large sums of money developing potential corn biopharm products. Grains are also easy to transport and store. Finally, the technology could ultimately result in needle-free vaccine delivery systems that do not require refrigeration or the participation of trained medical professionals. 263 Thus, biopharmed vaccines might be particularly suitable for use in the developing world, and could make a reality of the dream of universal vaccination.
Without adequate safeguards, however, this technology poses imminent risks that might dwarf those benefits. It all comes down to the fact that biopharmed corn and other crops are emphatically not for consumption as food, but are indistinguishable from crops intended for food. As such, biopharming really does pose new and fundamental safety challenges. Answering those challenges will require concentrated effort and significant investment from the regulatory agencies and the regulated community. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest a real commitment to building the sort of infrastructure needed to safely grow these crops. The specter of StarLink corn and ProdiGene is hovering. The next violation may not be caught in time, and the next crisis might not be so benign.
The integrity of the U.S. food supply is at stake. With a clear likelihood of contamination and no evidence that these crops are safe to consume, even in low levels, permitting commercial development of these products cannot be justified as scientifically sound or as a reasonable assessment of the costs and benefits. And, with the European Union, Japan, and Korea (our major grain commodity partners) 264 establishing threshold tolerance levels for GM contamination, the U.S. commodities export markets face potentially cataclysmic risks.
These failures to address the problem of contamination and commingling become even more critical now that the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety has entered into force. 265 Article 10 of the Protocol gives states the power to refuse import of the products of biotechnology in order to avoid or minimize adverse effects on human health or the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 266 It is hard to imagine anything more likely to trigger a refusal to import under the Cartagena Protocol than undetectable commingling of industrial or pharmaceutical crops containing non-food proteins with export food crops.
